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Richard C. Dibblee, and pursuant to Rule 35 of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure hereby petition this Court for a rehearing of
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
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Revised Model
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violate Article I, § 1 I of the Utah State Constitution?

1

Business
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2.

Did plaintiffs/appellants appropriately raise the issue of implied

attorney-client privilege at the trial level such that this Court should consider and
address that issue?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement of the case and facts
is sufficient. See Ho/man, eta/, v. Cal/ister, Duncan & Nebeker (Case No. 940486CA, October 26, 1995), attached as Addendum A.
ARGUMENT
I.

IF THE ACTIONS FILED BY HOLMAN AND ANDERSEN'S FORD
ARE CONTROLLED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § § 16-10-100 AND 101 AS OPPOSED TO THE UTAH REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT, THIS VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 11 OF THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION.

The actions filed by plaintiffs/appellants on July 13, 1994 {Andersen's Ford
Inc. v. Callister, Duncan and Nebeker) and January 7, 1994 {Ho/man v. Callister,
Duncan and Nebeker) should be governed by the Utah Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101 to -1705, adopted in 1992,
which provides that dissolving a corporation does not "prevent commencement of
a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-1405(2)(e) (1994).
Alternatively, if Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405is not applied to this case
and the case is governed instead under former Utah Code Ann. § § 16-10-100 and

2

-101 (repealed in 1992), those statutes violate Article I
Constitution, which states that
?

' t h e Utah State

II courts shall be open, anu .

r

HI11 in ma person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by

due course of law, which shall be administered without denial. . .." See also Sun
Valley Water Beds

i

1989) (statute unconstitutional because it did not provide an injured person with
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication

nf
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c

h
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unreasonable). If Utah Code Ann sk 16-10-1 OOand -101 are held to apply to this
case and

h

=>r any redress to plaintiffs/appellants for the malpractic

f

defendant/appellee, this would violate not only Article I, § 11 of the Utah State
Constitution but would also be a blatant and open invitation
s

r

thers to commit

h

;

put forth by plaintiffs/appellants in their briefs and at oral argument, the Court did
not analyze or address this argument in its opinion.
rcspiM llully i r q u i ' M l l u l Ihr I D I I I I

Plaintiffs/appellants now

n l i l i r v , tins p n i l n m nl l i i r n
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II.

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS APPROPRIATELY RAISED THE ISSUE
OF IMPLIED ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HOLMAN AND CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER AT THE
TRIAL LEVEL SUCH THAT THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER
AND ADDRESS THAT ISSUE.

In its opinion, this Court found that plaintiff/appellant Holman did not raise
the issue of an actual or implied attorney-client relationship between Holman and
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker at the trial level. Therefore, this Court did not reach
the merits of that argument which was also briefed and argued before the Court.
In finding that plaintiff/appellant Holman did not raise the issue at the trial level the
Court looked at the facts contained in plaintiff/appellant Holman's Affidavit in
Support of his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 1 The Court's

1

The facts the Court found relevant from that affidavit are contained in the
opinion and are as follows:
2.

At all times after January 1, 1982, Plaintiff held all of the
shares of stock of "Andersen's Ford, Inc.", with the exception
of the extremely minor holdings of two shares or stock held by
his immediate family.

3.

For many years prior to January 1, 1982, defendant had acted
as counsel to "Andersen's Ford, Inc." on virtually all matters
regarding its business affairs, and had secured approval directly
from plaintiff as to legal actions to be taken regarding the
corporation.

4.

At all times after January 1, 1982, Plaintiff was the sole
"director" or "officer" directing the actions and activities of the
"corporation" and was known to defendant to be the sole
person controlling the actions and operations of "Andersen's
Ford, Inc."
4

opinion does not recite any facts or arguments contained in plaintiff/appellant
Holman's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
While plaintiff/appellant Holman believes the facts recited in the Court's
opinion are alone sufficient to establish that the issue of an implied attorney-client
relationship was raised at the trial level, he believes the following facts and
statements taken from his Memorandum in Opposition further establish that such
issue was raised:
Plaintiff [Holman] contends that he retained and employed defendant
[Callister, Duncan & Nebeker] to undertake the asserted legal actions,
and that such services were subsequently performed on his behalf,
under the name of "Andersen's Ford, Inc." The services were
performed on his behalf because the corporation had been previously
involuntarily dissolved and, prior to the negligence of which plaintiff
complains, the "winding up" period of the corporation had similarly
expired. After that time, there was no existing corporation which
could remain a "client of Defendant" . . . .

At all times after September of 1982, Plaintiff [Holman] was the sole
stockholder, as well as the sole "director" or "officer" directing the
actions and activities of the "corporation" and was the sole person
controlling the actions and operations of "Andersen's Ford, Inc."
* * *

[L]ong after the dissolution of the Corporation "Andersen's Ford,
Inc.", defendant continued to provide extensive legal services

5.

At all times during the relationship with defendant, plaintiff
relied upon the advise and counsel of defendant on such
matters.
5

regarding the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, including those acts which
plaintiff claims to have constituted negligence and malpractice.
(Emphasis removed).
* * *

In determining that the corporation had been involuntarily dissolved
and had no statutory authority to engage in business at the time of
the alleged negligence and malpractice, the Court necessarily
determined that such services were not performed for the corporation
but, rather, for the plaintiff doing business as "Andersen's Ford, Inc."
* * #

Failure to apply [the doctrines of] collateral estoppel, [res judicata and
issue preclusion] to bar defendant's assertions that it provided such
services for the corporation and not for the plaintiff herein, under the
circumstances reflected above, would be contrary to the interests and
policies upon which those doctrines are based. (Emphasis removed).
* * *

Plaintiff submits that collateral estoppel or, more specifically, "issue
preclusion" should properly be applied to determine the issue that the
defendant in this case could not, in fact have been representing a then
non-existent corporation and, rather, were (sic) representing the
plaintiff [Holman] doing business as "Andersen's Ford, Inc."
* * *

Defendant should not now be permitted to seek protection under a
claim that the services were performed on behalf of that non-existent
corporation, rather than on behalf of the plaintiff.
* * *

"Reverse Piercing" of the "corporate veil" [where plaintiff Holman is
seen as the client rather than the corporation] in the manner sought
by plaintiff in this action, is not foreign to Utah Law.

6

Furthermore, plaintiff/appellant Holman's Complaint itself alleges that since
Andersen's Ford, Inc. was dissolved on September 30, 1982, Holman continued
to operate the business under the trade name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to
"remain a client of the Defendant [Callister, Duncan & Nebeker]." In dismissing
plaintiff/appellant Holman's Complaint, Judge Young necessarily determined that
Holman did not continue to "remain a client of [Callister, Duncan & Nebeker]" in
either an actual or implied capacity.

Based on the foregoing statements and

arguments, plaintiffs/appellants now respectfully request that the Court reach and
address this portion of their argument.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, plaintiffs/appellants pray that this Court grant a rehearing in this
case to further consider the arguments addressed in Part I of the opinion and reach
the merits of the arguments addressed in Part II of the opinion.
DATED this

^ day of November, 1995.

RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING this
November, 1995, to the following:

Cynthia K. C. Meyer
Stephen G. Morgan
Morgan & Hansen
136 South Main Street, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM A
Court of Appeals' Opinion in Ho/man et al. v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker

FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OCT 2 6 1935
COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Roland Holman, an individual
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc.,
and Andersen's Ford, Inc., a
Utah corporation,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 940486-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
F I L E D
(October 26, 1995)

v.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker fka
Greene, Callister & Nebeker, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis and
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Richard C. Dibblee, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Cynthia K. C. Meyer and Stephen G. Morgan, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Wilkins.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
In this consolidated appeal, Roland Holman and Andersen's
Ford, Inc. appeal two orders of two district court judges
dismissing their malpractice claims against Callister, Duncan,
and Nebeker (Callister). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Because we are reviewing motions to dismiss, we recite the
facts of this case in a light most favorable to appellants.
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156
(Utah App.
1994) . We note that Callister's view of the facts is less
egregious.

Andersen's Ford, Inc. was a used car dealership in Brigham
City, Utah. Holman was company president and majority
stockholder. Beginning in January 1979, Andersen's Ford, Inc.
experienced severe financial difficulties and, as a result,
failed to pay state and federal taxes. On September 30, 1982,
the State of Utah dissolved the company for failure to pay state
taxes. Nonetheless, Holman continued to operate the business
under the same name, Andersen's Ford, Inc.
In late 1982, the Internal Revenue Service demanded
immediate payment of back taxes and threatened to seize assets
belonging to the company. During April of 1983, Holman consulted
with Callister, and Callister recommended that Andersen's Ford,
Inc. file a petition in U.S. Bankruptcy Court to reorganize under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Holman claims that
Callister advised him that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy would allow
the IRS taxes to be paid under the supervision of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court. On May 2, 1983, Callister filed a Chapter 11
petition on behalf of Andersen's Ford, Inc.
The IRS filed a claim in Andersen's Ford, Inc.'s bankruptcy
proceedings for $154,004.83, which was later amended to
$127,403.09. This claim was disputed, but the confirmed plan of
reorganization provided that the, as-yet-undetermined, IRS claim
would be paid over a five-year period, with annual payments of
20% of the allowed claim plus interest. The IRS participated in
the plan confirmation hearing and knew of the approved plan's
terms.
In 1984, after the bankruptcy court approved the
reorganization plan, a settlement was reached with the IRS for
the payment of $56,000 in delinquent taxes. Holman claims
Callister failed to include this settlement agreement amount as
part of the record in the bankruptcy court either by
incorporating the amount of the settlement in an amendment or
addendum to the reorganization plan or by filing an appropriate
petition or motion. Holman claims this failure resulted in a
later demand by the IRS for approximately $122,000 in additional
payments for taxes, interest and penalties.
The IRS would not abide by the earlier settlement. Holman
hired a different law firm to represent the company in further
bankruptcy proceedings because the Callister attorneys were
needed as witnesses to the settlement negotiations with the IRS.
The new law firm filed an adversary proceeding, claiming the IRS
was bound by the terms of the settlement. Following a bench
trial, the bankruptcy court determined that the IRS was bound by
the 1984 settlement agreement, but that Andersen's Ford, Inc. had
underpaid the agreed-upon amount by $21,000.
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Two civil complaints were filed against Callister: First,
by Andersen's Ford, Inc. as plaintiff, on July 14, 1993, and
second, by Holman, dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., on January 7, 1994.
Each complaint alleged that Callister committed legal malpractice
by failing to incorporate the settlement agreement into the
bankruptcy court record. Both lawsuits alleged damages of
$96, 000--$75,000 in attorney fees and accounting costs and
$21,000 for the assessment of additional taxes.
The Andersen's Ford, Inc. suit was assigned to Third
District Court Judge Leslie A. Lewis. Callister filed a motion
to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Judge Lewis dismissed
the case on December 21, 1993, stating that Andersen's Ford,
Inc.'s claim was barred because it arose after corporate
dissolution and the suit was not part of corporate wind-up
activities.
The second case, filed by Holman personally, was assigned to
Third District Judge David S. Young. Once again, Callister filed
a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, this time
contending that Andersen's Ford, Inc. was the law firm's client,
and thus, the real party in interest. Moreover, Callister argued
that if Andersen's Ford, Inc. were found to be the real party in
interest, then the case must be dismissed based on the res
judicata effect of Judge Lewis' ruling. Judge Young dismissed
the case with prejudice on May 5, 1994.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Holman and Andersen's Ford, Inc. raise the following issues
on appeal:
(1) Did the trial court err in ruling that a dissolved
corporation is statutorily barred from pursuing a tort claim
after its dissolution?
(2) Did the trial court err in concluding that Holman was
not a proper party plaintiff in the malpractice action against
the law firm that represented Andersen's Ford, Inc. during the
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the trial courts received and considered factual
allegations outside the pleadings, the motions to dismiss and/or
for summary judgment are properly considered motions for summary
judgment. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124
(Utah 1994) . Therefore, in our review, we consider the evidence

940486-CA
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and all inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party
and will sustain the grant of summary judgment only if there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS
I.

Lawsuits by Dissolved Corporations.

Holman asserts that Judge Lewis erred in dismissing the
malpractice claim filed by the corporation. Holman argues that
if the relevant Utah statutes are construed as barring the
corporation's malpractice claim before the cause of action has
accrued, the statutes would violate the Utah Constitution, which
provides that "no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." Utah Const,
art. I, § 1 1 .
Under Utah law in effect at the time these cases arose, a
corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders could pursue
legal remedies "for any right or claim existing . . . prior to
such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is
commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution."
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (repealed July 1, 1992) (emphasis
added). Utah law also allowed a dissolved corporation to
continue a limited existence to "wind up" its affairs with
respect to property and assets that had not been distributed or
otherwise disposed of. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (repealed July
1, 1992) . " [T]o effect such purpose [,] such corporation may sell
or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be
sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and necessary
powers."1 Id. In addition, Callister asserts, without dispute
from Holman, that section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that if nonbankruptcy law fixes the time within which a debtor
may commence an action and such time has not expired prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, such action may be commenced
only before the later of either the end of such period or two
years following the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(a)
(West 1993) .

1. In 1992, the Utah Legislature adopted the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, which states that dissolving a
corporation does not "prevent commencement of a proceeding by or
against the corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-1405(2)(e) (Supp. 1994).

940486-CA
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Under the facts of this case, the State of Utah dissolved
Andersen's Ford, Inc. on September 30, 1982. The Chapter 11
petition was filed on May 3, 1983, within the two year period
provided by Utah law. Andersen's Ford, Inc.'s corporate capacity
for some purposes, was arguably extended two years beyond the
date of filing the bankruptcy petition, to May 3, 1985. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 108(a) (West 1993). The Amended Plan of
Reorganization was entered by the Bankruptcy Court on October 4,
1984. The IRS letter incorporating the agreed-upon amount owed
to it by Andersen's Ford, Inc. was dated November 2, 1984. The
malpractice alleged by Andersen's Ford, Inc. was the failure to
include the IRS settlement in the approved plan of
reorganization. The corporation did not file suit for the
alleged malpractice until 1994, well after the time that its
corporate existence, in any form, had ceased.
We conclude that these statutes do not allow a dissolved
corporation to pursue claims for malpractice after it has ceased
to exist in any manner as a corporate entity. Clearly,
Andersen's Ford, Inc. lacked any capacity to bring this suit in
1994, almost ten years after its legal existence had ceased.
Nor is there any common law basis for the corporation to
pursue the malpractice claim. Under the common law, a
corporation ceased to exist at dissolution. Platz v.
International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 350-51, 213 P. 187, 190
(1922). For that reason, a dissolved corporation was "incapable
of maintaining an action; and all such actions pending at the
time of dissolution abate, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125, 58 S. Ct. 125, 127 (1937).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order
dismissing the malpractice action filed on behalf of the
corporation.2
II.

Proper Party.

Holman also contends that Judge Young, the trial judge in
the second case, erred in ruling Holman was not a proper party
plaintiff. The trial court dismissed Holman's complaint after
concluding that Andersen's Ford, Inc., not Holman, was the party
2. We have considered Holman's argument that the trial court's
interpretation of the relevant statutes violated the Utah
Constitution and find it to be without merit. State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (stating appellate courts "need not
analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or
claim raised").

940486-CA
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in interest and, thus, an indispensable party to the lawsuit.
Additionally, Judge Young concluded that even if Andersen's Ford,
Inc. were joined, the case would still have to be dismissed
because of the res judicata effect of Judge Lewis' dismissal of
the complaint previously filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford, Inc.
Holman claims that although Andersen's Ford, Inc. was
Callister's client, Callister had an implied attorney/client
relationship with him personally. Holman argues that Callister
knew he was continuing to operate the business, despite the
corporate dissolution, and nevertheless advised him to file the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to halt the IRS's attempts to
collect taxes for which both he and the corporation were liable.
Holman relies primarily on the Utah Supreme Court case of
Maraulies by Maraulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985).
In Maraulies, the court found a conflict of interest existed
because an attorney-client relationship could be implied when
attorneys representing a physicians' limited partnership also
undertook to represent a patient in a lawsuit against one of the
partner physicians. JEd. at 1200. The court held that 1![e]ven in
the absence of an express attorney-client relationship,
circumstances may give rise to an implied professional
relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby
invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of law."
Id.
Callister argues that Holman's claim of an implied attorneyclient relationship should not be considered because it is a new
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Callister cites
Oner International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,
455 n.31 (Utah 1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated that
the trial court must address an argument before it may be
considered on appeal. An argument will be deemed to have been
raised before the trial court if the trial court had an
opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or conclusions of law.
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). The
argument must be reasonably discernible from the pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits. Jd. Moreover, even when an appellate
court liberally construes the record in favor of a party, as it
must on review of a summary judgment, there must be a "factual
showing or . . . submission of legal authority" before the
argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court
level. Id.
We therefore look to the record before the trial court, to
determine whether there were disputed issues of material fact or
legal argument presented on the issue of a possible implied
attorney-client relationship. In doing so, we resolve all doubts
in favor of Holman and allow for all reasonable inferences.
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The pertinent record before us consists of the pleadings,
Holman's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and
his affidavit supporting that memorandum. It is clear from this
record that Holman did not explicitly raise the issue before the
trial court. He did not cite any case law relevant to an implied
attorney-client relationship and did not allege that Callister
undertook to advise him in a personal capacity or even discussed
with him any potential personal liability. In addition, the
record does not include any factual assertions which might
indicate an implied attorney-client relationship. The relevant
portion of Holman's affidavit read as follows:
2. At all times after January 1, 1982,
Plaintiff held all of the shares of stock of
"Andersen's Ford, Inc.', with the exception
of the extremely minor holdings of two shares
of stock held by his immediate family.
3. For many years prior to January 1, 1982,
defendant had acted as counsel to "Andersen's
Ford, Inc." on virtually all matters
regarding its business affairs, and had
secured approval directly from plaintiff as
to legal actions to be taken regarding the
corporation.
4. At all times after January 1, 1982,
Plaintiff was the sole "director" or
"officer" directing the actions and
activities of the "corporation" and was known
to defendant to be the sole person
controlling the actions and operations of
"Andersen's Ford, Inc."
5. At all times during the relationship with
defendant, plaintiff relied upon the advice
and counsel of defendant on such matters.
None of these facts demonstrate the requisite factual showing
with regard to the existence of an implied attorney-client
relationship. All of the references are limited solely to the
relationship between Andersen's Ford, Inc. and Callister, not to
the relationship with Holman individually.
Having examined the record on appeal, we do not believe
Holman raised the issue of an implied lawyer-client relationship
before the trial court in a sufficient manner to allow the court
to analyze and decide the issue. Moreover, Holman did not assert
facts which, if believed and construed in his favor, would
establish an implied attorney-client relationship. We therefore
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conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Callister's
motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
The malpractice action filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford,
Inc. was properly dismissed. The State of Utah had dissolved the
corporation and all possible extension periods had expired prior
to the time this action was filed. Lacking a legal existence,
the corporation could not assert a cause of action.
We also conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing
Holman's action against Callister. Holman failed to raise the
issue of a possible implied attorney/client relationship before
the trial court by not alleging facts or presenting legal
arguments which would preserve such claim.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I CONCUR:

Michael J.Mtfilkins, Judge

I CONCUR,
EXCEPT AS TO SECTION I, IN WHICH I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY

Gregory K/^rme, Presiding Judge
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